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INTRODUCTION
As an anthropological historian rather than 
a political scientist, my understanding of 
the constructs “nation”, “state”, their hybrid, 
“nation state”, and their ideology, “nationalism” 
is always historicised and draws on recent 
anthropological theory, as well as specific 
ethnohistorical research in the new states and 
remaining colonies of Melanesia. In terms of 
my work as a fellow in the Australian National 
University’s State, Society and Governance 
in Melanesia Project, this means that I do 
not regard “state” and “society” as opposed 
real entities, but as highly general concepts 
that describe collective human actions. I take 
“governance” to refer not just to “government”, 
but to the myriad ways in which people organise 
themselves, attempt to control each other, and 
represent what they do in the process.
This paper starts with theory, in the shape of 
a comparative critique of certain programmatic 
propositions about the concepts “state”, 
“nation”, “nation state” and “nationalism”. 
I then shift to recent work, mainly by 
anthropologists, on the ambiguities of nation 
making in the highly diverse settings of 
postcolonial Melanesia, where “custom”/
“tradition” and indigenised Christianity are 
brought together politically to build national 
consciousness and cohesion, but also elude 
national encompassment to fuel longstanding 
local particularisms and a variety of alternative 
or “negative” nationalisms. Christianity is 
doubly resistant to nationalist appropriation, 
since it has long been seen by Melanesians 
to offer membership in pan-Pacific and global 
moral communities transcending the often 
dubious legitimacy of colonial and national 
states. In the guise of “the Melanesian 
Way”, custom arguably has similar region-wide 
identificatory potential, but in official discourses 
“the Melanesian Way” is usually also Christian. 
The paper alludes to, but does not specifically 
address, the current crises of the nation state in 
Fiji and Solomon Islands, and concludes with 
specific reflections on gendered experiences of 
citizenship in Vanuatu.
THEORETICAL POSITIONS
The theoretical moves sampled have 
common agendas to de-universalise, historicise 
and relativise nationalism and the nation state. 
It is no accident that all were made since 
the end of the 1970s by political scientists, 
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anthropologists and historians working outside 
or on the margins of Europe, while most 
were produced in specific historical conjunctures 
at the end of the Cold War. The theorists 
referred to are Timothy Mitchell, who works on 
colonialism in Egypt; Benedict Anderson, whose 
field is Indonesia; Daniel Segal, an ethnographer 
of postcolonial state formation in Trinidad and 
Tobago, writing alone and in tandem with 
Richard Handler, an ethnographer of Quebec 
separatism; and Bernard Cohn and Nicholas 
Dirks, historical anthropologists of India. I start 
with Mitchell’s Foucauldian de-reification and 
historicisation of the modern “state” as being: 
a structural effect[,]... not ... an actual 
structure, but ... the powerful, 
metaphysical effect of practices that 
make such structures appear to exist[,] 
... of detailed processes of spatial 
organization, temporal arrangement, 
functional specification, and supervision 
and surveillance, which create the 
appearance of a world fundamentally 
divided into state and society 
(1991:94-5; see also Abrams 1988:82). 
The other half of the reified compound 
entity “nation state” has been similarly 
de-objectified, most famously in Anderson’s 
“anthropological” definition of the “nation” 
as “an imagined political community”, with 
nationalism constituting the content of 
those imaginings (1991 [1983]:5-6; see also 
Gellner 1983).
Segal and Handler endorse and extend 
Anderson’s historical constructionism but make 
valid qualifications and criticisms. They argue 
that he normalises “contingent features of 
nationalism” by uncritically accepting “the 
presuppositions of boundedness and homogeneity 
embedded in nationalist ideology”; that he 
unwittingly reads “nationalist realities into the 
past, as if they had been there all along”; 
that he writes Eurocentric “social-evolutionary 
narratives” that privilege “Europe” as the site 
of a universal history of nationalism; that 
he “insists in general on the autonomy of 
nationalism and racism”, because he wants 
to render nationalism “fit to redeem the 
oppression of colonized peoples” (Segal and 
Handler 1992:4-8, my emphasis). In contrast, 
Segal contests “the common sense mythologies” 
– popular, élite and, increasingly, global, in 
the shape of dictatorial, coercive international 
agencies – which take for granted that 
“‘the nation’ is a human norm”, disparage 
alternative social arrangements as “‘deviant’” 
or “‘primitive’”, and naturalise “the world of 
humanity as a world of nations”, rooted “not 
in history, but in inherent human tendencies, 
desires, and needs” (Segal 1988:301, 303). 
Segal and Handler’s main contribution to 
the debate is twofold. First, they dislodge the 
complacent assumption that particular histories 
of nationalism within an objectified “Europe” 
are the final stage in a global narrative of 
universal social evolution. Second, by disclosing 
the “creole genealogies” of early European 
nations such as France and England, they go 
well beyond Anderson’s insight that “creole 
pioneers” invented nationalism with the late 
eighteenth century emergence of “national 
consciousnesses” in the Americas (Anderson 
1991:xiii, 61, 47-65). Segal and Handler trace 
intimate historical links “between nationalism 
and colonialism and between nationalism and 
race”. They seek thereby to particularise 
nationalism and displace its origins from “the 
place called ‘Europe’” to “globally dispersed 
colonial relations” (1992:1-2; Handler and 
Segal 1993:3, 4). This laudable effort “to 
explain homogeneity and boundedness as 
historically contingent features [of nationalism] 
... [constructed] in post-Columbian colonialism” 
sees Segal and Handler supplant a universalised 
history of “Europe” with simplistic histories of 
particular nations – notably “France” writ large 
to stand for “European”:
For the population of a monarchical 
realm to be imagined as a national 
“people”, the hierarchical differentiation 
of those persons had to be placed under 
erasure. Thus, a pre-condition of national 
identities ... was “individual equality”.... 
Geographically, the racialist leveling of 
the orders of Europe’s realms took place 
first at those realms’ colonial margins 
... [where] an “aristocracy of the skin” 
prevailed (Segal and Handler 1992:9).
According to this revisionist history, “the 
racialist leveling of the orders” in the colonies 
was repatriated to the metropole by a slave-
trading bourgeoisie and was fundamentally 
implicated in France’s late eighteenth century 
“revolution against hierarchy”, which 
transformed the monarchical “realm” into the 
republican “nation”, but restricted the “rights 
of man” to “the citizen” – a racialised status 
denied generically to blacks. Segal and Handler 
allow in a footnote that the concept of 
“the citizen” was also gendered and denied 
to women, but they ignore the internal class 
relations which limited the citizenship of 
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of “tradition” by colonial authorities in league 
with certain chiefs. That process entrenched 
social hierarchy and lodged postcolonial state 
and economic power firmly with an eastern 
Fijian chiefly élite, whose legitimating national 
narratives are by no means shared by other 
ethnic Fijians, such as ambitious businessmen, 
young unemployed men, and western Fijians 
generally (Rutz 1995; Thomas 1992:221). 
Thus the fault lines of class and region which 
fracture Fiji today are, like ethnic division, in 
part a colonial heritage.
In such settings, nationalist narratives are 
meant to forge images of shared identity and 
interests which aim simultaneously to promote 
internal solidarity, and to mark off the new 
nation externally, as essentially different from 
the past coloniser/cum present aid patron and 
capitalist exploiter (LiPuma 1995:50). Academic 
scholarship on nationalism in Melanesia has 
focussed mainly on the postcolonial era, not 
least because everywhere, apart from Vanuatu, 
independence was granted by imperial fiat rather 
than won in anticolonial struggle, and because 
indigenous anticolonial movements typically 
took a ritual shape that enabled them to be 
dismissed as “cargo cults” – as was the Tuka 
movement in Fiji, Maasina Rule in Solomon 
Islands, the Paliau movement in Papua New 
Guinea, Nagriamel in Vanuatu. 
There have been two main waves of 
anthropological scholarship on Melanesian 
nationalism. It was a theme in the copious 
“invention of tradition” literature of the 
1980s, which was sometimes ironic or sceptical 
about the authenticity of fabricated national 
cultures (e.g., Babadzan 1988; Keesing 1989; 
Lindstrom 1982; Philibert 1986; Tonkinson 
1982). Nationalism is central to more recent 
writing on nation making and national 
narratives, notably the collections edited by 
Foster and Otto and Thomas (Foster, ed. 
1995; Otto and Thomas, ed. 1997). This work 
typically emphasises “the tenuous and inchoate 
character of national cultures” in Melanesia and 
the invisibility of the nation in many hinterland 
areas, especially in Papua New Guinea. It 
sometimes questions the viability or even the 
necessity of the state, given the “political 
and economic integrity of local communities”, 
their self-sufficiency and potential to engage 
directly with the world market for their limited 
consumer needs (Clark 1997; Foster 1995:25-6; 
Jacobsen 1995; Kelly 1995:263-5; Otto and 
Thomas 1997:1). 
The French anthropologists Alban Bensa and 
Eric Wittersheim argue that “citizenship” itself 
workers and peasants (1992:10-13). Thus, while 
it is appropriate to inject race into histories of 
European nationalism, to ignore the ambiguous 
interface of race with class and gender in the 
experience of nationalisms within and beyond 
Europe makes for seriously partial narratives.
Cohn and Dirks emphasise a further critical 
“implication of colonialism in the project of 
the nation state”, that is pertinent to Melanesia 
today: “not only did empire provide the basis 
and ground of European domination, [but] 
it also worked through its own negativities, 
to reproduce itself after its own demise”. 
As new nation states sprang phoenix-like from 
disintegrating colonial orders, “nationalism as 
response to colonial experience reproduced 
(though with crucial differences) the European 
experience” (1988:226, 229). It is an irony and 
increasingly a tragedy of decolonisation that 
indigenous nationalisms have been, successively, 
repressed by colonialism, and then disparaged 
as shallow, inauthentic or merely ethnic by the 
universalising ethnocentrism of globalism.  
WEAK STATES IN POSTCOLONIAL 
MELANESIA: NATIONS MADE, 
UNMADE, REMADE
The very recent colonial genesis of modern 
Melanesian states – all became independent 
between 1970 and 1980 – is patently obvious. 
It is striking in the arbitrariness of national 
and provincial boundaries and lingua franca. 
It produced the awkward fit of imposed 
Westminster models of government with 
capitalist models of ideal relationships between 
the individual, the state and civil society 
– the latter conceived as free associations 
of autonomous individuals, and thus as 
fundamentally at odds with what are represented 
as the organic indigenous socialities of kinship 
and community (LiPuma 1995:47-8). 
Colonialism is also echoed in the global 
capitalist encompassment of Melanesian states, 
which ensures their ongoing economic 
dependence on external aid programs and 
resource extraction by multinational companies. 
Only Fiji could plausibly lay historical claim to 
have been a “natural” geographic and cultural 
unit – though certainly lacking precolonial 
political unity – but the indigenous Fijian 
illusion of cultural uniformity is ruptured by twin 
legacies of colonialism: a multi-ethnic populace, 
and, less obvious but at least as significant in the 
current crisis, the “collaborative objectification” 
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is “the source of the principal arguments over 
legitimacy” in postcolonial Pacific states, and that 
the burning question is whether control over 
land, goods and even people should “remain 
in the hands of local authorities who fiercely 
defend their autonomy” or be assumed by “state 
institutions that favor the national perspective 
over regional particularities” (1998:381). 
Increasingly, however, the latent opposition of 
local and national in Melanesian states is 
mediated via emergent regional identifications, 
such as to island, province or ethnic group, 
which are experienced as homegrown and more 
responsive to reciprocal obligations than the 
arbitrary or absent state (e.g., Jorgensen 1996; 
Nash and Ogan 1990). Jeffrey Clark speculates 
with respect to Papua New Guinea that “What 
could appear ... are postmodern nationalisms 
which are local and regional in terms of 
ethnicity and membership” and differ “totally” 
from the nations which emerged historically 
in Europe and the Americas (1997:70, 80, 
89). Such identities are variously rooted in 
indigenous exchange and ritual relationships, 
in common colonial histories as indentured 
labourers or converts, and in claims to shared 
ethnicity. It is on behalf of assertions to 
translocal but subnational identity that violent 
assaults have been made on the integrity of the 
nation state in Bougainville, Solomon Islands 
and incipiently in Fiji. The attraction and threat 
of such identities have seen embattled state 
authorities adopt “decentralisation” and “local 
empowerment” as goals and mantras in recent 
reform programs. 
CHRISTIAN CUSTOM AND “THE 
MELANESIAN WAY”
The content and emphases of particular 
nationalisms vary widely, depending on the 
preoccupations of the communities addressed – 
in broad terms they can be said to comprise 
historically relevant mixes of criteria such 
as language, religion, ethnicity, race, culture, 
history. One of the paradoxes of nationalism in 
that most kaleidoscopic of regions, Melanesia, 
is that its staples are everywhere the same: 
from Papua New Guinea to Fiji, nation 
makers play particular tunes on the common 
motifs of custom/tradition and Christianity. 
Thus, for example, during the independence 
struggle in Vanuatu the nationalist leadership of 
the Vanuaaku Pati sought to transcend internal 
divisions and diversity by strategically yoking 
Christianity to an abstract notion of generally 
shared indigenous kastom (“custom” in Bislama, 
the ni-Vanuatu version of Melanesian Pidgin). 
The founding Prime Minister of Vanuatu, the 
late Father Walter Lini, proclaimed in his 
independence address to the nation in 1980: 
“God and custom must be the sail and the 
steering-paddle of our canoe” (1980:62). Ellen 
Facey notes that “the Vanuaaku Pati won 
[the island of] Nguna with its ‘kastom within 
Christianity’ stance. Nothing else would have 
supported the local status quo, grounded as 
it is in the tandem structure of the chiefly 
system and the Presbyterian church leadership” 
(1995:209, 217). National political discourses in 
Vanuatu still frequently conflate custom with 
Christianity in literal, instrumental terms, as in 
this recent homily by a party leader who is 
also a Presbyterian Church elder: “When we 
do not honour the custom we organised to 
forgive one another and settle the issue then it 
means that the blood Jesus Christ shed on the 
cross to forgive our sins is meaningless” (Peter 
Taurokoto, Trading Post, 21 Mar. 1998). 
It was a distinctive feature of decolonisation 
in Melanesia that in each newly independent 
nation Christianity was installed by Christian 
leaders as a traditionalised state religion, and 
was enshrined along with custom in national 
constitutions and symbolic trappings as bases 
for national unity and identity. Thus the 
preamble to the Papua New Guinea constitution 
proclaims that “We, the people”:
• united in one nation
• pay homage to the memory of our 
ancestors, the source of our strength and 
origin of our combined heritage
• acknowledge the worthy customs and 
traditional wisdoms of our people, which 
have come down to us from generation to 
generation
• pledge ourselves to guard and pass on 
to those who come after us our noble 
traditions and the Christian principles 
that are ours now (Institute of Pacific 
Studies 1983, II:97).
The Solomon Islands constitution is equally 
“proud of the wisdom and the worthy customs 
of our ancestors” and similarly places the 
new sovereign state “under the guiding hand 
of God”. The preamble of the constitution 
of Vanuatu links tradition and Christianity 
even more explicitly by proclaiming the 
establishment of a republic “founded on 
traditional Melanesian values, faith in God, and 
Christian principles” (Institute of Pacific Studies 
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twentieth century many Papua New Guineans 
and most ni-Vanuatu, Solomon Islanders and 
Fijians were active Christians. The churches 
were and are the main – sometimes the only – 
providers of formal education in these countries. 
During much of the colonial era, mission or 
church groups were the one kind of formal 
translocal indigenous association permitted by 
racist colonial authorities, nervous about the 
spectre of revolt and more concerned for their 
own status and security than to pave the way 
for an effective national future. It is hardly 
surprising that many first-generation Melanesian 
nationalists and independence leaders were 
ordained priests or ministers. Even with 
the recent proliferation of pentecostal and 
charismatic groups – which are usually hostile 
to custom – there are far fewer Christian 
denominations than local versions of custom. 
This makes indigenised Christianity arguably 
the key national and transnational symbol 
throughout Melanesia, especially as in long 
Christian areas like Nguna and Fiji it is 
often the case that “Christianity is also 
regarded as traditional even though its European 
origin is fully acknowledged” (Facey 1995:218; 
Rutz 1995).
The status and potency of Christianity 
as an indigenised religion in Melanesian 
nations is no longer seriously in question, but 
much scholarly literature on nationalism in 
Melanesia nonetheless downplays Christianity 
and privileges custom, presumably because 
custom is at once exotic and seemingly more 
authentic. Thus Robert Foster introduces his 
edited collection, Nation Making, as follows:
Since independence,... political elites 
and local intelligentsia in these states 
have undertaken in earnest the work 
of producing images and ideal of 
nationhood. They have generated a 
steady discourse of custom and tradition 
that seeks to ground national 
distinctiveness in definitions of 
indigenous ancestral ways. Much of 
this discourse is official discourse. It is 
inscribed memorably, for example, in the 
preamble to the constitution of Papua 
New Guinea [quoted above] (1995:1). 
Despite its prominence in every Melanesian 
constitution, including Papua New Guinea’s, 
which Foster cites (1995:27), Christianity does 
not warrant a mention here or elsewhere in 
his introduction except in his summary of 
the chapters, though some of his contributors 
do take indigenous Christianity seriously. 
1983, II:231, 305). The phrase “worthy customs” 
itself encodes Christian values, since it refers 
to indigenous practices deemed acceptable by 
mainstream Christian Islanders. 
Christianity is a key sub-text in idealised 
pan-Oceanic conceptions of “the Melanesian 
Way” and “traditional Pacific life” propounded 
by nationalists and national leaders from Papua 
New Guinea to New Caledonia and beyond. 
The term “the Melanesian Way” was coined and 
popularised by the Papua New Guinean Bernard 
Narokobi, a committed Catholic (Narokobi 
1977, 1980:9, 23; Otto 1997:53-4). Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou, the late Kanak independence leader 
in New Caledonia, was a former Catholic 
priest who remained “strongly attached to his 
Christian principles”. In his book subtitled the 
Melanesian Way in English translation, Tjibaou 
acknowledges the importance of church groups 
in the renaissance of Kanak custom that he led 
in the 1970s (Bensa and Wittersheim 1998:374, 
387; Tjibaou and Missotte 1978:28-31, 104). 
Lini, who was an Anglican priest, argues that 
“because Jesus upheld justice for all mankind 
... the church must play its role in politics”. 
He draws on an oppositional narrative of 
national identity in Vanuatu that celebrates 
“Melanesian communalism” as “broadly 
compatible” with “the Christian religion”, 
but denigrates “alien concepts of materialism, 
individualism, and a narrow, insensitive brand 
of organised religion” as incompatible with both 
“traditional values” and Christianity (1980:19; 
1982:27). Similarly, Rev. Leslie Boseto, a leading 
politician and United Church theologian in 
Solomon Islands, describes “our traditional 
values” as “what God our creator has already 
given and established amongst us”. He 
counterposes the “sharing and caring” ethos 
of “traditional Pacific life” with the “greed, 
domination, competition and exploitation” of 
“the so-called ‘civilised nations’ of the west 
and the north” (1994:56-9). The polemical 
antithesis in these formulations is between 
“Melanesia” and “the West”; it is not between 
“custom” and “Christianity”, which are 
represented as in fundamental accord.
In Nguna, as everywhere in Vanuatu 
and Melanesia generally, custom provides a 
problematic and ambivalent symbol for national 
unity and identity: defined as “‘the way of doing 
(things) of the Land’”, it is “the basis of the 
Ngunese conception of their society, embodying 
the essential distinctiveness of Ngunese society as 
an integral entity vis-à-vis all others” in Vanuatu 
(Facey 1995:217-18, my emphasis). In contrast 
to the divisive potential of custom, by the mid 
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Foster, like many anthropologists, is evidently 
underwhelmed by the symbolic salience of 
Christianity, in tandem with custom, in 
national identities and nationalist ideologies 
throughout Melanesia. I suggest that they are 
erasing or not hearing important strands in the 
content and idioms of indigenous discourses 
(Douglas at press).
GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY AND 
“NEGATIVE NATIONALISM”
I remarked above that Christianity has long 
offered Melanesians membership in a global 
moral community which transcends the doubtful 
legitimacy accorded colonial and national states. 
The term “negative nationalism” is sometimes 
applied to anticolonial ideologies, as by Cohn 
and Dirks (1988:229). But it is also used in 
a novel and more interesting way by Joel 
Robbins in his ethnography of the Urapmin, 
a remote Papua New Guinea Highlands group 
who nonetheless have a “strong sense of 
transnational connectedness” by virtue of their 
intense involvement in millennial Christianity, 
which, in the absence of white missionaries, 
they have developed “along lines of their own 
choosing”, “as a local mode of understanding” 
(1995:214; 1997b:37; 1998:122). Their choices 
include random but regular injections of 
foreign dispensationalism which, locally 
translated, inspires periods of heightened 
millenarian activity and fuels the “globalizing 
apocalypticism” of their beliefs – the sense 
that they are more or less equal participants 
in a “shared”, global Christian millennialism 
(1997a:9, 11-12, 14-20; 1997b:40; 1998:106-7).
None of this is all that unusual in 
modern Melanesia. However, most ethnographic 
literature depicts national identities as novel, 
weak, resisted or non-existent in Melanesia, 
especially in hinterland areas (e.g., Clark 
1997; Jacobsen 1995; Kelly 1995; Stewart and 
Strathern 1998:133-4). Robbins, by contrast, 
maintains that “Urapmin national identity ... 
definitely exists”, but is “a source of deep 
unhappiness”. He argues that when national 
identity is correlated with other translocal 
identities, “it becomes clear that one can both 
hold a national identity and harbor extremely 
negative views of the nation of which one 
is a part”. This is “negative nationalism” and 
is clearly at odds with the normal scholarly 
equation of national identity with “a positive 
attachment to the nation” (1998:104, 108, 
110) – as in Anderson’s contention that 
“the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship” (1991:7). Urapmin 
identification with the Papua New Guinea 
nation and their self-recognition as inescapably 
Papua New Guinean are based on “their firm 
belief that the modern world is properly a 
world of nations”, though it is less a modernist 
belief than one derived from their reading of 
the Bible, especially Paul’s letters to apparently 
“nationally differentiated addressees” (1998:109). 
Accordingly, Urapmin “harbor no separatist or 
revolutionary dreams”, despite their chilling 
conviction that the nation of Papua New Guinea 
is racially inferior: in Urapmin cosmology, 
blacks, including themselves, are inferior to 
whites because they lack self-control. It is 
their imagined membership in a mostly white 
global Christian community, and their belief 
in an apocalyptic narrative, that together offer 
Urapmin the promise that “with God’s help 
and their own proper effort”, they can “improve 
themselves and eventually become the equal 
of whites” (1998:113, 115). Robbins speculates 
that, whereas in Urapmin reckoning “Jesus 
himself is white”, the villainous antichrist of 
their millennial narrative “represents a version 
of the modern state and its nation ... in their 
most intrusive form”, while the evil nation 
he is expected to establish in the imminent 
Apocalypse is “an analog of the existing 
black nation of Papua New Guinea”. Robbins 
concludes that of the three translocal identities 
held by the Urapmin – racial identity with 
other blacks, national identity as Papua New 
Guineans, and transnational Christian identity 
– “that of Christian is the most consequential” 
(1998:114, 117-122).
The stress placed on Christianity in this 
paper does not reflect my own religious 
allegiance, since I am agnostic (Robbins is 
Jewish). Rather it acknowledges the profound 
significance of Christianity to virtually all 
Melanesians, for whom religion is not a 
compartmentalised set of beliefs and rituals but 
an intimate lived experience and a strategy 
mobilised pragmatically to achieve private and 
public ends, including national ones. Every 
Melanesian I know believes in the practical 
efficacy of prayer. One Papua New Guinean 
woman describes “an increasing growth and 
awareness in the Word of God. More and more 
women, and more and more church groups 
are uniting forces. There are more corporate 
fellowships and prayer meetings, ... imagine how 
much prayer power can be sent up to heaven at 
any one time?” (Nadile 1998). For Melanesians 
the question is not just rhetorical. In 1997 the 
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“traditional” nor “national”, but registers an at 
once expanded and contained modern arena for 
male practice of custom and identity politics: 
the island. 
Women, by contrast, are largely confined 
to local and domestic spheres and enjoy few 
advantages from citizenship: for instance, their 
constitutional and legal rights to equality and 
protection against violence are consistently 
ignored or infringed by representatives of the 
police and the judiciary (Mason 2000; Vanuatu 
National Council of Women, Press Release, 
8 Feb. 2000). A few women have attained 
national repute since Independence, generally in 
women’s affairs but a handful in politics or the 
bureaucracy (Molisa 1987:19-22). Many of the 
latter, though, came to prominence during the 
independence struggle of the 1970s, often in 
the face of male hostility or disquiet. Their 
numbers have not swelled noticeably in the last 
decade, and in some respects have contracted. 
There has only ever been one female Member 
of Parliament in Vanuatu. In national elections 
in March 1998 fewer than ten women stood 
amongst more than two hundred candidates for 
fifty-two seats. No woman was elected ([Tari] 
1998:61-4; Vanuatu Weekly, 21 Mar. 1998).
I conclude this section with two episodes 
which dramatise the contingent, ambiguous 
interrelationships of religion, custom and gender 
in a modern Melanesian nation. From before 
Independence, ni-Vanuatu men have 
opportunistically yoked an insular conception 
of custom in support of arguments against 
women’s participation in the public sphere. A 
Council of Chiefs in north Efate tried to bar 
the candidature of women in the first national 
elections on the grounds that it was against 
local custom. In riposte, a prominent woman 
mobilised Christian values and a civic rights 
discourse to argue a very different nexus of 
gender, custom and national politics, expressing 
an optimism about the latter which has widely 
turned to cynicism or resignation: 
How absurd to think that what the Efate 
chiefs decide to be right or wrong in their 
custom, should be meant to influenze 
[sic] the welfare of the whole [national] 
community.... Politics concerns the ways 
to bring about the good of a country 
and its citizens. Both men and women 
being God’s creatures are equal in his 
sight – they are also citizens of a country 
with equal basic rights … We have 
been fighting against colonial injustices 
up to now and we are now ready to rule 
our own country.... [To] exclude women 
election defeat of the incumbent Papua New 
Guinea government was widely attributed to the 
intensity and volume of prayer power beamed 
to heaven during a national ecumenical prayer 
movement against corruption. 
GENDER, CUSTOM AND NATIONAL 
CITIZENSHIP
[As] women in Papua New Guinea, 
especially in the rural remote areas, 
we see ourselves first, then the churches 
and then the nation. We get less as 
citizens and serve more as Christians 
and citizens, and get served as women 
the least (Hopkos 2000).
Those words were written by a Papua New 
Guinean woman who at the time was president 
of the Ambunti District Council of Women. 
They serve as an apt epigraph for the final 
section of the paper, which reflects on gendered 
experiences of citizenship in the island of 
Aneityum in Vanuatu, and in Vanuatu generally. 
Aneityum, one of the most remote places 
in Vanuatu, could be taken as a microcosm of 
the nation: like the Urapmin, Aneityumese of 
both sexes do not doubt that their island is 
part of a nation or question their own status as 
ni-Vanuatu. But cast in (very recent) historical 
perspective, the nation of Vanuatu is an artificial 
collectivity and the oft maligned origin of the 
“politics” that are seen as corrosive to more 
organic socialities. In Aneityum, as in rural areas 
in Vanuatu generally, the state is present, but 
as an aggravation and an absence, for men 
and women alike. It is widely seen as divisive, 
corrupt and producing few of the benefits 
expected from payment of taxes and electoral 
support. In town, too, people acknowledge 
the state and accept their shared nationality, 
but even in urban areas national citizenship 
is relevant for relatively few, mostly men 
involved in politics and administration. Dorothy 
Regenvanu, one of only two female Presbyterian 
pastors in Vanuatu, sees nationalism as weak and 
island identity paramount. She illustrates her 
case with anecdotes about how things work in 
the Paton Memorial Church in Port Vila: “when 
they elect elders they would say, this elder’s from 
Malakula, therefore he’ll look after the Malakula 
people”; “they say for a church roster for 
cleaning, then the Malakulans will do it today, 
and next week it’ll be the Paamese” (Dorothy 
Regenvanu, 4 Aug. 1997). This determined 
insularity of most ni-Vanuatu men is neither 
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from our national decision making ... is 
pure injustice (Mildred Sope, Vanua’aku 
Viewpoints, 20 Sep. 1979).
Nearly twenty years later Barak Sope, 
a government minister soon to be Prime 
Minister, rehearsed the tactic of extrapolating an 
interested version of parochial custom into the 
modern state arena in an effort to delegitimise 
both the public activities of a woman and 
the authority of a state agency over his own 
dubious activities. He demanded the repeal of 
the Ombudsman Act on the grounds that “its 
content contradicted the traditional practices 
in Vanuatu”: the then Ombudsman, a French 
woman, “was very critical of many male leaders 
in her reports therefore she had contradicted the 
principles of the local society”, since “according 
to the custom of his home island ... men could 
not be criticised by women” (Radio Vanuatu 
News, 21 Nov. 1997).
CONCLUSION
In his conclusion to Nation Making (Foster, 
ed. 1995), John Kelly, an anthropologist of 
Indians in Fiji, observes: 
The history of nationalism shows us ... 
that it is easier to fashion a narrative 
that organizes a people, to consolidate it 
through apparatuses such as rituals and 
media, and to mobilize it to legitimate a 
state, or to capture control of one, than it 
is to realize, thereby, the elusive privileges 
of citizenship, as they were and are for the 
predatory [individualistic] “civil societies” 
of the leading nations (1995:268).
He suggests that the classic processes of 
nation-making in Western Europe in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries – 
themselves varied and historically contingent 
– have little in common with late twentieth 
century nation-making in former colonies on 
the margins of the global system (1995:266). 
This is in line with my early theoretical 
excursions. Kelly questions the very salience for 
the Melanesian region of the concept “nation 
state”: “in the Pacific, ... [states] have clearly 
focused their regulating on topics of foreign and 
capitalist interest” (1995:256). 
Melanesian states, then, are outward- rather 
than inward-looking, and typically are seen to 
ignore or deny the reciprocal obligations that 
indigenous people expect of social relations. 
Clark, for instance, suggests that in Southern 
Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea, 
people see themselves not as citizens but as 
“followers of the state”, which is “personified 
as a ‘big man’, who is bound by the morality 
and mentality of reciprocity to look after and 
redistribute resources to his followers”. Yet 
rather than the personified state returning in 
services the loyalty and taxes paid by its citizens, 
throughout Melanesia reciprocity in national 
settings tends, in spectacular versions of pork-
barrelling, to be the domain of individual 
politicians (Clark 1997:74, 81-2, 86-8; Stewart 
and Strathern 1998:134). All this means that 
there has been little kinship of interest or feeling 
between “the state” and “the [hypothetical] 
nation”, either at the time of the fashioning 
of “independent” regimes, or since. It means 
also that the codifying, disciplining, hegemonic 
Foucauldian state, as in Mitchell’s image with 
which I started the paper, is less in evidence 
in the Pacific than almost anywhere (Kelly 
1995:256). It seems clear, furthermore, that the 
gap between “state” and “nation” in Melanesia is 
growing, as local communities away from major 
centres are less and less engaged in state affairs, 
and as rival centres for “national” commitment 
grow in confidence and legitimacy – islands 
like Bougainville and Guadalcanal, provinces 
like the Solomons’ Western Province, ethnic 
groups like “the Min” in the Papua New Guinea 
Highlands, and “the Fijians”.
Segal and Handler propose as an “ideal-
typical model” that, “for the last two centuries”, 
“the nation” has been conceived as “a grouping 
of persons who are represented as a boundaried 
whole of like individuals”, and the “nation-
state” as “a sovereign territory legitimated as 
being of and for a ‘nation’” (1992:4). It is 
arguably the case in Melanesia today that there 
are “states”, but not “nation states”, and very few 
“citizens”, in the sense of equal members of a 
national polity. Not only are more effective and 
locally meaningful geopolitical arrangements 
needed to harness and channel the capacities 
and meet the aspirations of indigenous people, 
but more apt terms are required to describe them.
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